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INTRODUCTION
It is somewhat unusual for judges to speak
about the law publicly, except when they are
delivering judgments on cases.  Lord Hailsham,
the famous British lawyer, politician and wit, once
said that judges can maintain an unassailable
reputation for wisdom as long as they keep their
mouths shut.  So, it is with some trepidation that
I speak on what is essentially a very ‘legal’ topic.
The modern law of Negligence dates from
1932, when the case of Donoghue v Stevenson 2
was decided by the House of Lords.  The case
originated in Scotland.  Ms Donoghue had drunk
ginger beer out of a bottle in which there was
said to have been the decomposed body of a snail.
She became ill and sued the seller of the ginger
beer even though she had not bought it herself
and therefore had no contract with that seller.
Until that time English judges had been very
resistant to the idea that a duty to compensate a
person injured could be imposed on someone in
circumstances other than where there was a
mutually binding contract between the parties, a
relationship entered into between the parties in
some kind of quasi-contractual way, or a
relationship of a particular category well defined
by the cases as they then stood.
This is not to say that the idea of a general
duty of care had not been around for some time.
At the end of the 19th century, the English courts
had begun to try to formulate some theory
whereby a duty could be imposed upon a person
outside the area of contract, outside the situation
where the person had accepted the duty as part
of a quasi-contractual obligation, and outside
those other areas accepted by the law as imposing
a duty. Two cases that were determinative in this
area were Heaven v Pender 3 in 1883, and Le
Lievre v Gould 4 in 1893.  In these cases Sir
William Brett, who was Master of the Rolls (the
head of the Court of Appeal) together with Lord
Justice A. L. Smith, formulated ideas about duty
of care which were taken up seriously only half a
century later, in 1932.
DUTY OF CARE
I thought I would start by looking briefly at
Lord Atkin’s judgment in Donoghue v Stevenson,
the 1932 case, and then see where Australian law
has gone from that point, in the search for what
various judges and writers have referred to as the
“unifying principle” of the duty of care in
negligence.  Is there a universal quality or
character to a relationship between two people
such that a court is able to say that in a particular
circumstance one of those people has a duty to
take reasonable care for the other?
“Duty of care” is a great phrase.  It has been
picked up by journalists and social workers in
recent times and is now indiscriminately
attributed to almost anybody against whom an
allegation of neglect or carelessness is being
made.  I find it fascinating to read in a newspaper
that somebody has breached his duty of care, or
that somebody else is going to be disciplined for
breaching his duty of care, or that somebody else
ought to have a duty of care in circumstances
where even the most liberal legal theorists would
deny that such a duty existed.  But what does it
mean?
Well, it is a legal term of art. It is the first of
the three elements that a claimant must establish
before he or she can successfully sue in negli-
gence.  When a lawyer talks about negligence,
he or she means the breach of a recognised legal
duty of care, which causes damage.  The damage
may be, and in many cases is, personal injury.  It
may also be physical injury to property, or it may
be economic loss. In this address I will talk mostly
about personal injury, because I suspect that, as
people involved with education of the young, this
is the area in which you will be most interested.
As I said before, when a lawyer talks about a
duty of care, he or she is referring to the duty
that the law imposes, and for the breach of which,
if it causes damage, a person can sue. Since
Donoghue v Stevenson in 1932, there has been a
search by the courts — in England, New Zealand,
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… there has been a search
by the courts
— in England,
New Zealand, Canada
and the USA
as well as Australia —
for some unifying touchstone
or principle by which
the existence of a duty of care
can be universally determined.
Canada and the USA as well as Australia — for
some unifying touchstone or principle by which
the existence of a duty of care can be universally
determined.  As has often been said, you can be
as careless as you like if the person who is affected
by your carelessness is not somebody to whom
you owe a duty of care.  There is no such thing as
negligence in the air.  You can only be legally
negligent in respect of someone to whom you owe
a duty of care.
If one goes back to what Lord Atkin said in
1932 it can be seen that not much has changed so
far as the search for such a universal principle is
concerned.  Perhaps he foreshadowed the
difficulties the courts were going to face in their
search for that principle when he said:
“It is remarkable how difficult it is to find
in the English authorities statements of
general application defining the relations
between parties that give rise to the duty.
The Courts are concerned with the
particular relations which come before
them in actual litigation, and it is sufficient
to say whether the duty exists in each of
those circumstances …” 5
What he is really saying is that it is sufficient
in each case to determine what the duty of care
is.  But what is the criterion?  Is there some
unifying principle?  Is there some quality
attaching to a relationship which, if it exists,
means that there will always coexist with that
relationship a concomitant duty of care?
The elusiveness of this unifying principle
means that the courts have traditionally engaged
in an elaborate classification of duties as they
exist.  These classifications might be in respect
of property, whether real or personal, with further
divisions based upon ownership, occupation or
control.  They have embraced distinctions based
on a particular relationship of a particular plaintiff
to the particular defendant whether manufacturer,
salesman, landlord, customer, stranger, teacher
and so on.  In this way, it was thought it could
always be ascertained whether the law recognised
a duty in any particular circumstance, but only
when the case could be placed into some
recognised category.
Lord Atkin’s test for a duty of care
Lord Atkin was asking whether there was
some way in every case that the existence of a
duty of care could be determined.  He said that
liability ought to be based on a general public
sentiment of moral blameworthiness, for which
the offender must pay. In other words, liability
should be rooted in fault.
He then formulated the classic test for the
existence of a duty of care.  Every law student
knows the passage almost by heart.
“…[A]cts or omissions which any moral
code would censure cannot in a practical
world be treated so as to give a right to
every person injured by them to demand
relief. In this way rules of law arise which
limit the range of complainants and the
extent of their remedy. The rule that you
are to love your neighbour becomes in law,
you must not injure your neighbour; and
the lawyer’s question, Who is my
neighbour?, receives a restricted reply.
You must take reasonable care to avoid
acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to
injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law
is my neighbour? The answer seems to be
- persons who are so closely and directly
affected by my act that I ought reasonably
to have them in contemplation as being so
affected when I am directing my mind to
the acts or omissions which are called in
question.” 6
Lord Atkin is saying a duty of care will be
imposed where there is a foreseeable risk of injury
to someone who is in such proximity to the actor
that he could be called a “neighbour”, in the sense
that the judge has used it here. He suggests that
this should be the touchstone upon which the duty
of care in negligence can always be determined.
This proposition, enunciated in 1932, was
distilled from the earlier thoughts of A L Smith
LJ, Brett MR and the other judges who had
discussed the broad issues of policy in the late
1800s, in the cases I mentioned earlier and others
at about the same time.
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The Court said that …
… Not only should
an employer be liable
for his own acts of negligence,
but he ought to be liable
for those whom he employs
to fulfil the duty of care
that is personally imposed
upon him.
Advances in the 1960s, 1970s
and 1980s
Things then went along in a somewhat
dilatory manner for many years.  It was probably
only in the ’70s and ’80s that this area of law
began to be re-examined and the law of
negligence as we now know it began to develop.
In 1984 we leave England and take up a case in
Australia, called Jaensch v Coffey 7.  The High
Court, in particular, perhaps, Justice Deane (who
later became Governor General and has recently
retired) began a series of cases that has continued
right up to the present.  In these cases the basic
principles of negligence have been examined
again and again. To a lawyer with an interest in
the topic they make fascinating reading.  To one
engaged in arguing cases on a day to day basis
they are required reading; and by no means
always easy reading at that.
Jaensch v Coffey  was the case of a South
Australian policeman’s wife who suffered a
psychiatric reaction when she was told, and later
saw, that her husband had been knocked off his
police motor cycle and was very severely brain
damaged.  Here is some of what Justice Deane
said in that case:
“It is an incident of human society that
action or inaction by one person may have
a direct or indirect effect on another.
Unless there be more involved than mere
cause and effect however, the law remains
indifferent.  A person’s action or inaction
may be a cause of another’s injury or
discomfort; unless there be some
particular relationship, personal or
proprietary right or other added element,
common law imposes no liability to make
payment of compensation or other
damages.  In a society where material
success, commonly measured in compara-
tive terms, is accepted as a legitimate
objective and the preservation of
individual freedom of action or speech is
acknowledged as a legitimate goal, the law
must remain so restrained if it is to be
attuned to social standards and reality.  If
material success were to be accompanied
by legal liability to all who have suffered
emotional chagrin or physical or material
damage as a consequence or along the
way, it would be largely self-destructive.
In that regard, the common law has neither
recognised fault in the conduct of the
feasting Dives nor embraced the
embarrassing moral perception that he
who has failed to feed the man dying from
hunger has truly killed him.” 8
This case appears to have commenced a
fundamental re-evaluation of the law of
negligence, and in particular the consideration of
what it is that distinguishes liability in one case
from no liability in another.  A generation after
Donoghue v Stevenson Sir William Deane
returned to what Lord Atkin had meant when he
talked about proximity — somebody who was
close or a neighbour.  Was this then the unifying
principle which had proved elusive?  Was it really
there all the time?
Until Donoghue v Stevenson in 1932 there had
been a series of situations where a defendant
could be held liable if he or she was in a particular,
rigidly defined, relationship with the plaintiff.  For
example, if a person occupied premises, and
somebody came into those premises and was
injured because of a defect in the premises, they
could probably sue successfully.
That principle goes back at least to a case of
Indemaur v Dames 9  in 1866. In other situations,
where, for example, water escapes from
somebody’s property and goes on to somebody
else’s property — as in the case of Rylands v
Fletcher 10 — liability would traditionally have
been imposed.  But there always had to be a
recognised relationship between the parties,
which relationship had been recognised in earlier
cases as giving rise to a duty of care.
In the almost twenty years since Jaensch v
Coffey the High Court has continued to develop
the law of negligence in the Australian context.
The concepts discussed in Jaensch v Coffey have
been analysed and reanalysed again and again.  I
shall mention an almost random selection of the
cases decided by the High Court since 1984 as
illustrative of the point I am making.
In 1984 the Court looked at the question of
an employer’s liability towards his employees and
said the duty of care that an employer owed could
not be delegated — an employer could not
effectively say
“I have done my best. I’ve contracted with
someone who is competent to do a certain
part of the work function and by so doing
I’ve discharged my duty of care towards
my employees.”
The Court said that this was not good enough.
Not only should an employer be liable for his
own acts of negligence, but he ought to be liable
for those whom he employs to fulfil the duty of
care that is personally imposed upon him.  It
reiterated the idea, which came from the 19 th
century, of the non-delegable duty of care.
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The school is responsible
personally for the
“safety” of the child
in the school situation,
in the same way that
an employer is responsible
for his employee.
In the context of the ANZELA conference, it
is interesting that in the same case, Kondis v State
Transport Authority11, almost as an aside, Justice
Mason said:
“Likewise with a school authority.  It is
under a duty to ensure that reasonable care
is taken of pupils attending the school. It
is the immaturity  and inexperience of the
children and their propensity for mischief
that lie at the basis of the special
responsibility which the law imposes on a
school authority to take care for their
safety: Introvigne 12.  The child’s need for
care and supervision is so essential that it
is a necessary inference of fact from the
acceptance of the child by the school
authority, ‘that the school authority
undertakes not only to employ proper staff
but to give the child reasonable care’ to
use the words of Kitto J. in Ramsay v
Larsen 13.”
So the school authority, like the employer, is
saddled not only with a duty to take care; it has a
duty to ensure that care is taken.  It is not sufficient
for the school authority to say “Well, we employ
a competent teacher.”  The school is responsible
personally for the “safety” of the child in the
school situation, in the same way that an employer
is responsible for his employee.
In 1986 the Court looked at another area of
negligence — the question of “extra hazardous
activities”.  It rejected the idea that extra
hazardous activities per se gave rise to a duty of
care where it would otherwise not exist but
reiterated the personal nature of an employee’s
duty of care.  That case was called Stevens v
Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd 14.
In 1987, the Court took a giant step forward,
in lawyers’ terms at least, when it abolished the
technical rules which came from the 19th century
and related to the duty of care imposed upon the
occupier of premises.  As I said previously, there
had always been a recognition by the law that if
you occupied premises you owed certain
responsibilities to people who came onto those
premises.  Lawyers had hitherto engaged in hair-
splitting determinations as to whether somebody
entered premises as what was called an “invitee”
or a “licensee”, as a trespasser or as a person who
entered under a contract.
 In 1987, the High Court said that this didn’t
matter any more.  From now on, we should take
the principle that Lord Atkin spoke of and look
at the question in terms of whether there is a
sufficient proximity between the person who
enters the premises and the person who occupies
the premises. There is no need, the Court
suggested, to engage in the sterile task of trying
to determine in what capacity the claimant came
onto the property if other criteria giving rise to a
duty were present.
In the case concerned, a Mrs Zaluzna slipped
over on the Safeway supermarket floor out at
Forest Hill.  Her case became the one in which
the High Court abolished what the Judges referred
to as “the barren exercise of categorisation” of
people into one category or another, where if two
people walked into a building it would be possible
for them to have duties of care of different content
in their favour.
For example, one person could be entering
as a licensee, permitted to go into the building,
while the other might be coming to conduct some
kind of business, and would be entitled to a higher
standard of care by ranking as an invitee.  Seeing
this sort of distinction as a barren exercise, the
Court abolished the occupier’s duties in favour
of the imposition of the general duty of care that
Lord Atkin had spoken of.
The High Court took the specific case of Mrs
Zaluzna, together with the earlier case of Shaw v
Hackshaw 15 and rewrote the law of negligence
in this area.  As Justice Deane said in Australian
Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna:
“All that is necessary is to determine
whether, in all the relevant circumstances
including the fact of the defendant’s
occupation of the premises and the manner
of the plaintiff’s entry upon them, the
defendant owed a duty of care, under the
ordinary principles of negligence, to the
plaintiff. 16”
The Court said there was no need to engage
in a categorisation process as to whether an
entrant to premises had come on to the premises
as a trespasser or as an invitee, as Mrs Zaluzna
had at the supermarket.
Interestingly, just as the High Court abolished
the old legal distinctions between the various
categories for entrants into property, in Victoria
the legislature altered the law itself, to effect
almost exactly the same result 17.
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It might be said that
if a teacher acted in a
particular way
professionally,
and a reasonable body
of opinion among
other teachers said that
that teacher had not acted
negligently,
then he or she would not be
found to be negligent.
However, the High Court
said that is no longer the
test in Australia.
The 1990s
In 1995 the court looked at questions of
causation.  There have always been arguments
amongst lawyers as to how you determine
questions of cause and effect.  The same issue
has, of course, always interested philosophers and
scientists, but from different perspectives.  What
are the mechanics of an action which causes a
particular effect?  How does one determine in a
legal action whether a particular effect should be
compensible as having resulted from a particular
cause?
In March v Stramare 15 the High Court
adopted the simply stated (but not always equally
simply applied) test of causation as being
“common sense”.
In 1992, the High Court decided a landmark
case in the area of medical negligence.  In the
case of Rogers v Whitaker 19 it turned its attention
to how a court should determine whether a doctor
has been negligent. (For doctor you could read
“architect”, “engineer” or any other professional
or skilled person.)  Up until then it was commonly
accepted by lawyers that a professional person
would not be guilty of negligence if he acted in
accordance with the practice accepted as proper
by a responsible body of other professional people
in the same discipline.  Doctors traditionally
defended their position by calling as witnesses
other doctors who said something like:
“Well, I would have done that in exactly
the same way”
or, alternatively, perhaps,
“I might not have acted in exactly the same
way, but what he did I don’t regard as
being outside the ordinary bounds of
professional competence.”
In your context as educators, you could read
“teacher” instead of “doctor”.  The same situation
applies.  It might be said that if a teacher acted in
a particular way professionally, and a reasonable
body of opinion among other teachers said that
that teacher had not acted negligently, then he or
she would not be found to be negligent.  However,
the High Court said that is no longer the test in
Australia.  It is still the test in England, where it
derived from the case of Bolam v Friern Hospital
Committee 20 in 1957.
In 1992 the High Court turned that principle
on its head.  In Rogers v Whitaker 21, the plaintiff
had been advised to have a particular eye
operation.  She asked the doctor repeatedly for
information about the operation and, in particular,
asked whether there was any risk of blindness
from the operation.  He did not answer her
questions. In the event, she had the operation and
went blind.  In the trial of the action brought
against him, the doctor called a number of other
doctors who said they too, would not have given
the information to the patient.  It might have
frightened her, such that she would have decided
not have the operation which they believed she
needed.
The statistical risk of going blind as a result
of the operation  — one in more than a thousand
— was relatively low, they said.  But this depends
upon your point of view.  If you become blind, it
is not low.  If, on the other hand, you win
Tattslotto, you don’t regard that possibility as
remote at all. It all depends on where you stand.
The High Court said that it was inappropriate
for the doctor to take it upon himself to say, in
effect “I am not going to tell this patient because
it might frighten her”.  The Court, in a movement
away from paternalism, said she had a right to
know what the risk was, and to assess it herself.
It said this:
“In Australia, it has been accepted that
the standard of care to be observed by a
person with  some special skill or
competence is that of the ordinary skilled
person exercising and professing to have
that special skill. 22 But, that standard is
not determined solely or even primarily
by reference to the practice followed or
supported by a responsible body of opinion
in the relevant profession or trade 23… it
is for the courts to adjudicate on what is
the appropriate standard of care after
giving weight to the paramount consi-
deration that a person is entitled to make
his own decisions about his life. 24”25
That case, as you might imagine, sent a
rumble through the medical profession.  In my
former “existence” I acted for a number of
medical indemnity organisations.  It is extremely
difficult to convince doctors that this is the law
— that they are required to pass on to their
patients information which the patient reasonably
requires, or asks for, such as the risks inherent in
any procedure they were contemplating or
recommending.  It is not a decision which has
met with universal approval in the medical
profession.  But it is the law of this country.
In Rogers the High Court accepted the
reasoning in South Australia called the F v R 26,
an important decision of the Supreme Court of
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The development of the law
is not an academic exercise.
In determining cases,
the Court endeavours
to ensure that a liability
is only imposed when justified.
Society can only operate
if there is a balance.
The idea that there is
a cheque book
behind every disaster
is one the law
cannot countenance.
In all of the cases to which
I have referred
the Court sought to ensure
that the line was drawn
in the right place
South Australia, in which the Chief Justice said
that the ultimate question was:
“not whether the defendant’s conduct
accords with the practices of his profession
or some part of it, but whether it conforms
to the standard of reasonable care
demanded by the law. That is a question
for the court and the duty of deciding it
cannot be delegated to any profession or
group in the community.”
So much for Rogers and Whitaker.  Another
major development occurred in 1994, in a case
called Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty
Ltd 27 an action brought after a wharf burned down
in Burnie, Tasmania.  In dealing with that case,
The High Court abolished a principle which had
existed since 1866, from the ruling in Rylands v
Fletcher which I have already mentioned.  Again,
every law student knows about that case.  It
concerned the obligations of a person who
brought water onto his property which sub-
sequently overflowed and damaged neighbouring
properties.  Since Rylands v Fletcher, this had
given rise to a specific right of action.  The High
Court, in 1994, effectively abolished that right
of action, and determined that for relief in those
circumstances one needed to look to the law of
negligence.
In one sense these were step-by-step
modifications.  In another they represent a
philosophical expansion of some of the more
difficult concepts relating to negligence generally
and to the concept of the duty of care in particular.
However it is characterised, there has been a
continuing process of development in recent
times, led by judges like Justice Deane, Justice
Brennan, Justice Kirby and others.
Prior to 1996, it was thought that a landlord
was immune from a suit for negligence from
somebody visiting his tenant’s premises.  In 1996,
in Queensland, a little girl was electrocuted when
she turned off a cold water tap after the pipe had
become “live” by reason of a negligently caused
fault.  The High Court said that because the
landlord came within the proximity principle —
within the principle of being the “neighbour”, in
Lord Atkin’s sense — of the little girl, he was
liable in negligence.
It is not unusual in the development of the
law, for an argument or line of reasoning to be
“in vogue” for a few years after which a court
reconsiders it and determines that a different track
should be followed.  In 1985, in a case called
Hayman v Shire of Sutherland 28 Justice Mason,
who later became Chief Justice, said that where
citizens rely — in a general, non-specific sort of
way — on organs of government or regulatory
or safety authorities, to protect them from certain
types of harm, a sufficient proximity for the
purposes of negligence would be established so
as to give rise to a duty of care.
He derived this concept from a series of
American cases, in which the issue had been
considered.  For example, an American court had
said that when you get on a plane, you don’t know
who it is who keeps the plane in the air, or who it
is who navigates it.  You know the pilot is
involved.  You know the airline company which
owns the plane has something to do with it. You
also have a vague notion that somebody “out
there” regulates things and tells the pilot of your
plane not to fly at the same level as the pilot of
the plane that is about to take off in five minutes
time.  Justice Mason said that this created what
he called a “general reliance” — an idea that there
was somebody out there looking after us, and that
this gave rise to a duty of care.
In 1998, the High Court took another look at
this area. It turned its attention to public
authorities, city councils and the like and, for a
while, it tested a theory.  The 1998 case was
Pyrenees Shire Council v Day 29.  A fire had
broken out in a fish and chip shop in the tiny
Victorian town of Beaufort, in circumstances
where it was proved the local council had known
that a fireplace in which the fire started was faulty.
The Court examined the principle of “general
reliance” in this context and the judges, after
considerable debate and by a majority of 4 to 3,
decided that the principle of general reliance was
a fiction, and that they would withdraw from it.
The Court determined that it was inappropriate
to widen liability in that sort of way.
The development of the law is not an
academic exercise.  In determining cases, the
Court endeavours to ensure that a liability is only
imposed when justified.  Society can only operate
if there is a balance.  The idea that there is a
cheque book behind every disaster is one the law
cannot countenance.  In all of the cases to which
I have referred the Court sought to ensure that
the line was drawn in the right place.
I should add that in the Pyrenees case, Justice
Kirby took the opportunity to consider the whole
question of negligence again and promoted a
three-stage test to determine the existence of a
duty of care.  He said that not only should there
be proximity or neighbourhood, but that a duty
of care should only exist when it is just and
reasonable that it should do so.
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For those of you
who are not familiar with
the hierarchy of courts
in Australia,
the High Court sits
only as an ultimate court
of appeal.
…  The High Court does not
hear cases as of right.
… In order to get a case
to the High Court,
you must obtain “special leave”,
which is only granted
if the Court determines
that your case involves
an issue of great
public interest.
The new millennium
And so we get to this year, and the High Court
has not been inactive. For about 200 years there
has been a principle that if a road authority made
a road, it might be liable for accidents that were
caused by the road — for example by potholes
or misplaced drain covers and the like; but only
if it engaged in what the law called
“misfeasance”.  It was not liable if its only fault
was one involving “non-feasance”.  Lawyers
spent a lot of time arguing whether an accident
was caused by misfeasance (the doing of
something wrongly) or non-feasance (not doing
it at all).
For example, is the pothole in the road there
because the road was badly built in the first place
or is it there because the rain has been particularly
heavy in the last six months?  This sort of
consideration, arcane as it might seem, was of
great importance to councils and road authorities
which construct highways at enormous expense
to all of us.  The principle derived from a very
old idea that the parish, which used to make the
roads, could only be liable if it did something
that was actively negligent, not simply passively
negligent.
In a case called Brodie v Singleton Shire
Council 30, the High Court reconsidered this
principle.  Despite the fact that in two cases (in
1936 and 1950) the same Court had said that the
law of misfeasance and non-feasance still applied
in Australia, in 2001 the Court abolished the rule.
Henceforth, the ordinary rules of negligence will
apply to road authorities as to anyone else who
owes a duty of care in particular circumstances
to another.
Between 1987 and the end of the year 2000,
105 tort cases were heard by the High Court. For
those of you who are not familiar with the
hierarchy of courts in Australia, the High Court
sits only as an ultimate court of appeal. It does
not decide primary liability.  The High Court does
not hear cases as of right.  A filtering system is in
place.  In order to get a case to the High Court,
you must obtain “special leave”, which is only
granted if the Court determines that your case
involves an issue of great public interest.  The
High Court will not hear a case simply because
someone asserts that the local intermediate court
of appeal — which exists in each state — has
made a mistake.
All of the 105 tort cases determined by the
High Court since 1987 involved some principle
of public interest, which the High Court
considered was of sufficient importance to
warrant it being considered.  There are only seven
High Court judges and they hear something like
eighty or ninety cases a year; an enormous
workload, considering that at least five of the
seven must sit on each case.  In addition, they
write judgements which are often of great length
and complexity.
The cases of which I have spoken this
morning are only a very small selection of those
which have reached the High Court. Forty-nine
of the 105 tort cases since 1987 were personal
injury cases, in the area of negligence. In almost
every decision there was some modification, one
way or the other, in what had hitherto constituted
the law of Australia.  I have not even touched on
developments such as those initiated in Perre v
Apand Pty Ltd 31, Hill v Van Erp 32 or Astley v
Austrust Ltd 33 and many of the other tort cases
decided in the last few years.  They will have to
await another occasion.
Pure economic loss and other issues
In the brief review undertaken here, I have
left out all the negligence cases involving what
is called “pure economic loss”, an area perhaps
about to burgeon in a significant way.  In these
cases the breach of somebody’s duty of care has
led not to personal injury (as it would in a motor
car accident, or in slipping over) but, rather to
the closure of a business, the dismissal of workers,
the loss of jobs, or economic loss of other kinds.
These cases have their own particular difficulties
and problems.  Doubtless the High Court will
continue to plough the fields of the law in this
area in the coming years.
There are still many issues that the High Court
has not considered or has not said the final word
upon.  One example concerns an aspect of the
assessment of damages.  How, for instance, do
you assess the loss of what is called “a chance”?
This can be significant in medical negligence
litigation. What happens if someone had a chance
(but not the certainty) of a cure from a particular
operation but, due to the negligence of the doctor,
they have lost that chance?  Such areas remain to
be explored in greater detail than they have been
in the past.
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DUTY OF CARE:
QUESTIONS OF LAW
AND QUESTIONS OF FACT
IN A SCHOOL CONTEXT
The duty of care question is only one of the
three questions to be answered before a person
can succeed in a claim in negligence.  It is the
first question.  It is determined, as I have outlined,
by asking whether the person against whom the
allegation is made should reasonably have
foreseen that his or her particular act, or failure
to act, was likely to produce a risk of injury,
provided of course sufficient proximity (or such
other criteria as is acceptable at the particular
time) exists in the particular relationship
The second and third questions are questions
of fact, which in Victoria are determined, (about
half the time at least), by juries.  In the other states
they are mostly determined by judges.  This is
the area in which most of you, in the field of
education, will be concerned.
There is no question that a school authority, a
school and a teacher, all have duties of care to
their students. That is beyond argument.  The
question you face as educational administrators
is usually whether the duty has been breached.
What is the standard that is applicable to the
particular duty of care imposed in the particular
case?  What is the content of the duty is in any
particular case? — These are questions of fact.
A successful defence to an allegation of a
breach of a duty of care will always involve
demonstrating that: “I have acted as a reasonable
teacher, a reasonable school authority, or a
reasonable school administrator (as the case may
be) would have in the circumstances”, because
that is the standard by which the question of
breach of duty will be assessed.
 What is reasonable?  This does not mean
falling into the trap exposed by Rogers v
Whitaker; it is not for the reasonable teacher to
say definitively what the standard is.  But it is
about looking at what the reasonable teacher
would have done in the circumstances.  Was the
school excursion conducted in accordance with
the way most school excursions are conducted?
Are there any relevant regulations? Were those
regulations adhered to?  And so on.
Sometimes you can look at it simply and say,
in layman’s terms: “Have we been careless?”.
That is a good starting point. If the answer is
“yes”, it is probably fruitless mounting a defence
to the particular allegation of negligence.
However, there may be circumstances where you
think you were not careless, but the court may
still find that a duty of care has been breached.
Protection
In terms of protection, all I can suggest is
education, observation and forward planning.
You should have systems in place, (for example)
to ensure that risk assessors are available to
inspect schools and systems and help audit current
risks and practices.  An experienced school
administrator or teacher should acquire a
metaphorical antenna, which quivers when any
area of risk is walked through, or observed.  With
experience, one should be able to see potential
areas of risk.  After all, one of the bases of
negligence is reasonable foreseeability.
Common sense is vital.  Should we move that
step?  Is it a hazard?  Are the screws holding that
basketball ring to the wall secure enough?  If you
were to look at a basketball ring and see that the
screws were coming out, it would be an act of
folly, if not an act of gross negligence, to walk
past and do nothing about it.
An important aspect of protection is the
keeping of accurate records.  Often litigation
occurs long after the event is over.  It is not a
useful answer to say that you did not keep a
record. The maintenance of records may be
onerous and a nuisance, but is of enormous
assistance if you are required to state what
occurred on a particular day at a particular time.
It is also wise to remember that every record you
create may ultimately be placed in the hands of
those who seek to sue you.  There is no such
principle as “commercial in confidence”
(whatever that means) in litigation.
In summary, the way to stay “un-sued” is to
be careful.
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CLOSING COMMENTS
Developments in the law of negligence are
one thing.  Courts look after those. Developments
in the practice of litigation are another thing.
They are looked after in all sorts of ways, and by
the market, to some extent.  We have seen the
phenomenon of “No-win, No-fee” agreements in
Australia in the last few years.  The Americans
call this kind of arrangement a “contingent fee”.
They also have an arrangement pursuant to which
the proceeds of the action is divided between the
lawyer and the plaintiff; an arrangement not
currently in use here.
Supporters of this practice say that such
arrangements provide the “key to the courthouse”
for plaintiffs who otherwise would not be able to
sue.  Critics say it promotes unnecessary expense
and vexatious litigation for the benefit of lawyers.
Again, it depends where you stand.
The promotion of litigation was frowned upon
by the common law.  It was frowned upon,
perhaps, because the interests which stood to gain
from the absence of litigation were often
establishment interests, namely the insurers and
the “big end of town”.  These days there is more
preparedness to promote litigation. Is that a good
thing or a bad thing?  A year ago I might have
waxed lyrical about that!  Now I had better be
more circumspect.
The other matter I wish to mention is what
the Americans call “class actions”. These are a
new phenomenon in Australia.  We call them
“group proceedings”.  The idea that a number of
people can sue through one person and all take
the benefit of the action was quite foreign until
recently but we are getting used to it. There are
complex issues in this area which are still being
developed.  Again, the American supporters of
such a system say that group proceedings or class
actions enable proper justice to be delivered to
those who otherwise might be unable to obtain it
for lack of financial resources.  Again, opinions
on this will vary.
The law of negligence will continue to
change. With each new examination of the funda-
mental principles by the High Court there will
be further refinement of those principles. What-
ever happens, you, as people connected with the
education profession, must continue to be aware
that you do have a duty of care, you do have to
discharge that duty of care, and if you breach that
duty of care, you may end up sitting behind your
lawyer, in a courtroom looking up at someone
like me grappling with the latest High Court
judgment and trying to apply it to the factual
situation into which you have fallen.  I can assure
you there are better ways of spending your time.
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… you, as people connected with
the education profession,
must continue to be aware
that you do have a duty of care,
you do have to discharge
that duty of care, and
if you breach that duty of care,
you may end up sitting behind
your lawyer, in a courtroom
looking up at someone like me …
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